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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * * * * * *

PINETREE ASSOCIATES d/b/a
PINETREE CONDOMINIUMS
Plaintiffs-Appellees,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

-vsEPHRAIM CITY, a municipal
corporation,

Case No. 20010129 SC

Defendant-Appellant.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a Judgment entered by the Sixth
Judicial District Court, Honorable David L. Mower on January 30,
2001.

Notice of Appeal was filed February 28, 2001.

(R. 969)

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under
the Judicial Code §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated 1953.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
[To promote clarity

(Rule 24(d), U.R.A.P.) Plaintiffs-

Appellees Pinetree Condominiums will be referred to as "Pinetree
Condominiums" or "Pinetree" and Defendant-Appellant Ephraim City
will be referred to as "City."]
Issue I.

Whether or not the Judgment should be affirmed

which awarded Pinetree Condominiums $45,165.17 as a refund of

monthly minimum charges assessed to the several owners of the
individually-owned condominium units representing excess charges
for distribution of the culinary water requirements which went to
each unit of the entire structure although through a single water
line.

One connection's monthly rate was charged each of the

units.

Pinetree Condominiums' claim for and the trial court's

award to them of the refunded judgment is that a payment and
single

fee

owners

for

for one connection exonerated
monthly

minimum

charges,

the

all

the

trial

condominium
court

held,

unlawfully had been made by the City to all (dwelling) units.1
Issue II. Whether or not an interim summary judgment can
appropriately be granted against the City upon oral evidence

that

unidentified "city personnel" stated to the contractor overseeing
construction of the condominium units that a single main line into
the condominium structure of thirty units would better accommodate
the overall condominiums, was unilaterally interpreted by Pinetree
Condominiums to mean (and approved by the trial court was) that
all of the individual condominium units would be exempted from any
further monthly minimum culinary water assessments after the oneline fee was imposed. No evidence was offered either establishing

x

One rate resolution - asserted to advance the trial court's
decision in favor of Pinetree Condominiums - uses the word
"measured to each connecting unit" (R.IO) %B WATER RATES: All water
measured to the customer (dwelling, unit, apartment, etc.); the
term "measure" emphasized by the trial court's underscoring at
R.442 H25.
2

the date, time, place or persons present; nor was any other
foundation for which the "city personnel's" (title or authority
also unexpressed) statement was made.2
Standard of Review
Summary judgment

(or as in this case judgment based on

affidavits alone) is granted only when "there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact" and the "moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."

(Rule 56 [c] , Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure) In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, an appellate
court views "the facts in a light most favorable to the losing
party

below"

conclusions
correctness."

and
of

gives
law:

"no
those

deference

to

conclusions

the

trial

court's

are

reviewed

for

(Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634,

636-637 [Utah 1989]) Correctness is also the standard of review of
questions of statutory interpretation; in this case interpretation
of a City Ordinance as well as statutory language in the chapter
on condominiums (Chapter 8 of Title 57, Utah Code 1953)

(Stephens

v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 [Utah 1997])
Although the judgment entered at R.953-958

is in the

nature of a Rule 54 (b) discretionary Order where "the court may
direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer

2

The "city personnel" was completely unidentified; as were the
date, time, place and circumstances under which this comment was
given to the condominium general contractor Robert Fitch(R.301);
Parallel statement by Cahoon (R.108-111).
3

than all of the claims***" the Order appears to be in the nature
of

an

interim

summary

judgment

although

an

"auxiliary"

pronouncement dated January 30, 2001 and filed February 15, 2001
(R.95 0-952) as a money judgment appears to be the final judgment.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS
Article XI, §6, Utah Constitution.
No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly,
lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water
rights, or sources of water supply now, or hereafter to
be owned or controlled by it; but all such waterworks,
water rights and sources of water supply now owned or
hereafter to be acquired by any municipal corporation,
shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable
charges: Provided, that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to prevent any such municipal corporation from
exchanging water-rights, or sources of water supply, for
other water-rights or sources of water supply of equal
value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public
supply of its inhabitants.
Section 10-8-14(1)(a) and (b), Utah Code Annotated 1953
reads as follows:
(1) A city may:
(a) construct, maintain, and operate waterworks,
sewer collection, sewer treatment systems, gas works,
electric light works, telecommunications lines, cable
television lines, or public transportation systems;
(b) authorize the construction, maintenance and
operation of the works or systems listed in Subsection
(1)(a) by others; ***
Section

57-8-4

of

the

Utah

Condominium

Act

reads

as

follows:
Each unit, together with its undivided interest in the

4

common areas and facilities, shall, for all purposes,
constitute real property and may be individually
conveyed, leased and encumbered and may be inherited or
devised by will and be subject to all types of juridic
acts inter vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and
entirely independent of all other units, and the separate
units shall have the same incidents as real property, and
the corresponding individual titles and interests therein
shall be recordable.
Section 57-8-6, Utah Code Annotated reads as follows:
Each unit owner shall be entitled to the exclusive
ownership and possession of his unit.***
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The

case

is

one

for

interpretation

of

the almost

universally employed, typically-enforced city ordinance fixing a
minimum

monthly

charge

for

each

unit

connected;

also

the

application of that ordinance under the Utah Condominium Act
provides a combination of the considerations of the case.

This

charge was applied to all thirty units in Phase I of the Pinetree
Condominium units.

The trial court held this to be a redundant

charge for one-line service although all units received the full
dwelling requirements for each unit.
Utah has a typically uniform Condominium Ownership Act,
Chapter 8 of Title 57, U.C.A. 1953, throughout which chapter each
condominium is regarded as a separate property totally unrelated
to every other unit in the construction encompassing every given
unit.

5

For example, §57-8-6 states:
Each unit owner shall be entitled to the
exclusive ownership and possession of his unit.
***

Section 57-8-4 next preceding with the catch line "Status
of the units" states:
Each unit, together with its undivided interest
in the common areas and facilities, shall, for
all purposes, constitute real property and may
be individually conveyed, leased and encumbered
and may be inherited or devised by will and be
subject to all types of juridic acts inter
vivos or mortis causa as if it were sole and
entirely independent of all other units, and
the separate units shall have
the same
incidents
as
real
property,
and
the
corresponding individual titles and interests
therein shall be recordable.
The trial court held that irrespective of the statutory
definition and declaration of condominium unit ownership the City
could charge but one assessment to the main line which served all
thirty units.
Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below
The case was decided on motions for summary judgment:
i.e.,

the

trial

court's

order granted

Pinetree

Condominiums'

motion for summary judgment (R.435-446) which order is predicated
on trial court's finding that water service to be chargeable by
the City must be measured to the customer3. [R-442, f2 5] Under that

3

(Dwelling, unit, apartment, hotel, boarding house, trailer,
commercial establishment, business, industry, school, church, etc.)
6

interpretation the trial court gave Pinetree Condominiums a money
judgment as a refund of 2 9 units' monthly minimum charge for
Pinetree's calculated number of years.

The trial court obviously

utilized the term "measured" as a limitation on the number of
minimum monthly charges that could be imposed where culinary water
is delivered under only one main line.

The trial court confirmed

this interpretation by the final judgment for payment of damages
in the amount of $45,165.17.

(R.950-952) The trial court's ruling

on November 17, 2000 (R.771-774) appears to determine all other
issues when combined with the order of January 30, 2001 (R-953959) from which this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.
stating

five

Pinetree Condominiums filed their complaint (R.l-8)
causes

of

action

alleging

various

"invidious"

constitutional violations doing damage to Pinetree Condominiums.
No constitutional claim was established.
2.

On September 28, 1994 (R-179) then District Juoge

Don V. Tibbs granted two motions of the City to dismiss and in
reserving decision on the one critical to the case Judge Tibbs
ruled as follows:
5. As to the Plaintiff's third cause of
action, the motion to dismiss is denied.
It
appears to the court that separate water meters
should be installed at Plaintiffs
expense
if
Defendant is charging each user on their
minimum rate schedule [emphasis supplied]. (R180)

7

3.

Pinetree Condominiums never installed nor asked for

installation of those separate meters as ordered but continued
making what they called upayments under protest" then brought this
action to recover those charges and were granted a money judgment
in the amount of $45,165.17.
4.

The case was still pending at the retirement of

Judge Tibbs and on April 3, 1997 the Honorable David L. Mower who
succeeded him on the bench entered his

"Order on

Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment" on this one critical issue.

(R.43 5-

436) This April 1997 order, although not certified under Rule
54(b) that the holding may be appealable, nevertheless became the
predicate the trial court employed
January 30, 2002.

for his final judgment of

This finding, although sought by

Pinetree

Condominiums as a partial summary judgment (R.44 0) is exclusively
detectable as the sole reason for the trial court's money judgment
of January 30, 2001.
Order that meters

The trial court first passed over the Tibbs

should be

installed

at the expense

Plaintiffs by the statement that:
***The conflict arises in reading Judge Tibbs'
order of September 28, 1994. It seems to say
that thirty separate water meters should be
installed, and with that part I agree.
The
problem is that the order goes on to say that
the expense of installing the thirty meters
should be borne by the plaintiff.
This seems like a strange result to me when the
facts, as stated herein, show that it was the
defendant's advice
that resulted in the one-

8

of the

(R.444)4 (Emphasis added)

meter installation.
5.

Again Judge Mower relies on the foundation-deficient

statement of the Pinetree Condominiums contractor that he, Robert
Fitch (R.101-103), dealt with some unidentified "city personnel"
at some unidentified time or place at which, admittedly in the
affidavits,

(R.301-303)

no

one was

present

except

for

the

contractor and the unidentified city personnel.
6.

The most generic finding of the trial court is found

in the interpretation of the City's ordinance of one word which
the trial court viewed as the use of an unfortunate (for the City)
term - the word "measured" - where at paragraph 25 on R.442 he
states (quoting):
The Rate Resolution
pertinent part that:

provides

in

its

only

All water measured to the customer (dwelling
unit, apartment, hotel, boarding house,
trailer, commercial establishment, business,
industry, school, church, etc.) shall be paid
monthly at the minimum rate *** (Emphasis
added)
7.

The trial court then added as a non-sequitur the

observation that

[1(35] "Pinetree

(describing all thirty units

collectively) pays the water bill because there is only one bill
and one meter," an interpretation fatal to the City since the

4

The exclusive and only evidence of that "advice": parallel
statements by Cahoon (R.108-111) and Fitch (R.301) are both without
a singular foundation, elaboration, or corroboration: no where,
when, who was present; or what was said.
9

trial court's final result is that it is sufficient if Pinetree
Condominiums pays only one minimum monthly charge for 3 0 units.
8.

The interpretation of the City ordinance which the

trial court does not justify is that while the City cannot measure
water going into each separate condominium "unit" nevertheless the
ordinance does provide that all water measured to the customer
(dwelling

unit,

commercial

apartment,

establishment,

hotel,

business,

boarding

house,

trailer,

industry,

school, church,

etc.) shall be paid monthly at the rate of $10.80 for the first
seven thousand (7,000) gallons of water used per month (together
with an overage

for use beyond the 7,000 gallons).

Pinetree

Condominiums pays sewage service charges without complaint on a
per unit rather than on a single freestanding building basis.
9.

The

trial

court

finds

some

confusion

in

the

circumstance that overcharge (beyond the first 7,000 gallons) is
charged at ascending rates.

The overcharge is neither expressed,

claimed, or explained in Pinetree Condominiums' pleadings.

It may

be expected that overages seldom occur but should they emerge any
slight overcharge is absorbed; Pinetree Condominiums making no
effort to explain how nor complain of this phenomena.
10.
maintained

At all times material to this case Ephraim City

water,

sewer

and

electrical

10

rate

and

regulation

ordinances and resolutions under §10-7-7, Utah Code Annotated.5
The Municipal Code itself, in §10-7-7, defines "users" as "*** any
house, tenement, apartment, building, place, premises, or lot
* * *# "

11.
official

Upon a more expanded, retrospective search of its

records, the City discovered

from its minutes the

February 17, 1982 recorded minute entry
Addendum No. 1)

(attached hereto as

which reads verbatim exactly as recorded that:

Ken Cahoon and Robert Fitch of the Pine Tree
Condominium Project propose to change the 30
unit student housing to 3 0 unit condominium
project due to financing problems. The only
difference would be that each unit would have
an owner, then rental to students could be a
possibility. Families could buy if they wish.
Does the Council approve the concept of
condominiums? ***ready for construction April
1.
Water and sewer billings will be on
multiple service (30 X -) . ***Total cost approx
$1.2 million. ***They ask for assurance that
the community will accept the condominium
concept. *** (R.910-915)
12. Pinetree Condominiums made payments for each of the
thirty

condominiums

but

argues, without

evidence,

that

the

payments were made under protest.
13.

The Pinetree Condominium approved Fitch Affidavit

(R.301) is dated January 31, 1994 which Pinetree Condominiums
produced as its only tangible evidence even though inadmissible

Especially §§10-7-10, -11 and -12, statutes authorizing
cities and towns to operate and charge reasonable fees for all
culinary water distribution and collection for sewer.
11

for no foundation (Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.) . It is the only evidence
we can marshal except for the almost identical affidavit of Ken
Cahoon at R.111.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A city could not, even if there were proof bhat it had
done so, delegate the authority to an official

to contravene

ordinances of the city such as those pertaining to culinary water
delivery, distribution and the rates charged therefor (§10-6-76,
U.C.A.
1978)

1953).
this

In Martindale v. Anderson, 581 P.2d 1022

Court

held

that

policymaking

(Utah

considerations

and

functions assigned to the governing body cannot be delegated to
ministerial workers.
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of authority,
the

council

exercises

has

no

executive

power

to delegate

and

it only

its power in adopting the ordinances which established

the policy to be executed by [in this case the mayor] in reviewing
and approving subdivisions

[in the Martindale case, 581 P.2d at

1025] .
Even if these limitations were never in effect there is
no admissible evidence in the record under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.
that a city official [of any type, kind or status] authorized an
abdication

of

the

city

ordinances

ordinances.

12

on

rate

regulations

and

ARGUMENT
The record is totally absent of any admissible evidence
that

a

member

of

"city

personnel"

as

alleged

by

Pinetree

Condominiums, gave the contractor Robert Fitch, or anyone else the
authority

even

to

provide

culinary

water

service

to

the

condominiums consisting of thirty units by one line.
In marshaling the evidence of Pinetree Condominiums it
may be agreed that the single line has been there for almost
twenty years and no objection has ever been made to its existence
or to the payment of thirty minimum monthly charges by the City
which Pinetree Condominiums now wants refunded.

Conceding that

fact as contributing to the evidence which we are obligated to
marshal on behalf of Pinetree Condominiums the existence of one
water main does not excuse or exempt every unit

from or the

requirement to pay monthly charges under the ordinance of the
City,

as

unit

is

defined

not

only

in

the

ordinance

but

specifically by state law (§57-8-6, U.C.A. 1953) respecting the
separateness of

condominiums as units.

In 62 C.J.S. at page 275, Municipal Corporations §152 (b)
it is stated:
In the absence of express authority, the
governing body of the corporation must itself
exercise general discretionary powers, they
cannot be exercised by any other board [or
person] .
The governing body of a municipal
corporation, entrusted by the state with the
police power, is prevented from delegating its
high functions to any body or officer and
13

although it may be discharged by others it is
only those to whom the city commits it.
In the Montana case of Lazich v. City of Butte, 154 P.2d
260 (1944) it is held that municipalities have only such powers as
are expressly granted and those powers cannot be delegated.
In the Martindale case (581 P.2d 1022 [Utah 1978]) it is
said (581 P.2d at 1028):
Consistent with the doctrine of separation of
powers, the [city] council has no executive
powers to delegate and it only exercise[s] its
legislative powers in adopting the ordinances
which established the policies to be executed
by the mayor [in this case] reviewing and
approving subdivisions.
Lastly, it is inconceivable that an ordinance as plainly
drawn as that of the City of Ephraim
verifiably

attempted

-

subverted

by

could be
an

act

- if in fact

of

an

inferior

(subordinate) officer and it cannot be necessarily inferred that
if "city personnel" (Pinetree7s best evidence) approved one line
into a condominium building the City personnel also exempted all
other condominium units for a monthly minimum charge.
It also cannot be disregarded that condominium units are
separate properties, have no common interest except in the very
limited way authorized by the Condominium Act and it is by having
w

common

areas" which

condominium units.

are used

by

the

owners

of

the

various

The Condominium Act term in the "common area"

cannot be interpreted

to make all thirty members of

Pinetree

Condominiums Phase I (nor Phases II and III which are patterned
14

after Phase I) one large dwelling unit occupying and benefitting
by the exclusion or exemption from an ordinance which imposes
minimum monthly culinary water charges to every "unit" as defined
specifically - at the least - as "dwellings".
The
this

action

City
has

for

all

consistent

Regulation

Ordinances

"Ordinance"

or

or

periods

of

water

(and

correlative

"Resolution")

10, Utah Code Annotated6

under

time

material

sewer)

Rate

resolutions

Chapter

7

of

to
and
(the

Title

Inclusive within which:

Provide
a
consistently
followed
definition
of
a
"dwelling
unit"
[as]
one or more rooms and a single kitchen
in
a
dwelling
or
apartment,
hotel,
designed as unit for occupancy by one
family,
individual,
or
individuals
for
living and sleeping purposes.7
(R.482,
296, 298)
Prohibited expressly are additional or multiple
connections on one distribution line (it is a
misdemeanor for additional
units to be
connected to any service line). (R.498)
Treat housing, boarding of persons, trailers
and other similar dwelling units as an adapted
equation for each consumer, other than
residential, as separate and individual sewer
service lines.

6

Esp. §§10-7-10, -11, and -14: The statutes authorizing cities
and towns to operate and charge reasonable fees for culinary water
distribution and collection of sewage. Section 10-7-10 defines
users as "***any house, tenement, apartment, building, place,
premises, or lot***."
7

A concept now applied by the City and universally in Utah
municipalities in substantially equivalent form.
15

There have been no objections excepting to this type
policy or rate schedule.

(R.24)

Pinetree Condominiums' complaint charged, and the trial
court agreed, that the curiously active verb ''measured"8 was to be
that limiting - or expanding, from whichever view - barometer for
monthly rate charging rather than the assumed or practical term
"delivered", "used", or "consumed" as a monthly assessment to each
unit for water and sewer.
Every

municipal

inhabitant

must

pay

for water

at

a

reasonable charge because of overwhelming scarcity in arid Utah.
(Piatt, et al. v. Town of Torrev, 949 P.2d 325 [Utah 1997])
This philosophy is so strong that in three cases the
Supreme Court has held that boards of commissioners
may

(of cities)

not obligate future city councils how to determine and fix

reasonable rates. (Piatt, et al. v. Town of Torrey, supra, and
Brummitt

v.

Ocrden Water

Works,

33

U

289,

93

P

828

[1908];

Fielstead v. Oaden City, 83 U 278, P.2d 144 [1933])
The

City

called

the

Court's

Condominium Ownership Act, Chapter

attention

to

the

Utah

8 of Title 57, Utah Code.

Section 57-8-4, Status of Units, provides:
Each
unit,
constitute

***shall,
for
real
property

8

all
and

purposes,
may
be

The term "measurement" is used as a "filler" in one city
resolution.
Relating to water rates, however, it could not be
applicable since the sewage, another part of the assessment is not,
we think at lease, "measured."
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individually conveyed ***as if it were solely
and entirely independent of all other units and
the
separate units shall have
the
same
incidents
as
real
property
and
the
corresponding individual titles and interest
therein shall be recordable.
(The codified definition of "units" went unrespected by Judge
Mower.)
When the Honorable David L. Mower took jurisdiction of
this case he remarked of Judge Tibbs' Order of September 28, 1994
u

that it was

a strange result.'7

Nonetheless, Judge Mower never

did expressly reverse the holding of Judge Tibbs or acknowledge
that

separate meters should be established

at the expense of

Pinetree Condominiums or in any other manner.

(R.444, 445)

Judge Mower, while disregarding both the ruling of Judge
Tibbs

and

the Utah

condominium unit

Condominium Act

for

its

definition

of

a

(§57-8-4) and with no evidence other than the

Robert Fitch Affidavit which was neither evidence nor admissible
in evidence because of a failure of foundation

(recited supra)

declared unalterably that the minimum monthly charge could only be
imposed upon water "measured" to any unit; separate delivery,
service,

or

"demand"

on

unimportant to the court.

the

water

system

capability

being

(R.445)

The trial court ruled that the Affidavit of Robert Fitch
was

adequate

and

ordered

the

City

to

rebate

to

Pinetree

Condominiums the sum of $47,445.50 as the amounts which the trial
court held were overage and redundant assessments to twenty-nine
17

unaccountable condominium units because water was not "measured"
to each of the separate units leaving the ruling of Judge Don V.
Tibbs reversed by implication.
Evidenced by affidavits submitted by the City it was
established that all other (of very many) structures in the City,
in which there were separately constructed units, paid assessments
prescribed (by ordinance) for them individually.
TO MARSHAL PINETREE CONDOMINIUMS' EVIDENCE.
At

the

trial

court's

suggestion

in

response

to the

urging of Pinetree Condominiums, a summary of all chcirges which
Pinetree Condominium believed to be excessive overpayments by
Pinetree

Condominiums

was

assembled

as

an

accounting

of

its

claimed damages.
The City had nothing by which proof either of lack or
diminution of Pinetree Condominiums' numbers could be challenged.
The

City

stood

on

the

basis

of

no

liability

of

any

kind,

contending that damages alone do not create a cause of action.9
(Schmeck v. City of Shawnee, 647 P.2d 1263 [Kan. 1982])
The City did cite cases that do allow a judge to change
his mind; however, this Court is abundantly aware of its policy
when determining that objections were adequately reserved in the
Record.

9

There was never an appealable ruling or order eligible

(Maxim) Damnum Absque

Injuria
18

esse

potest.

or as a qualification for appellate jurisdiction until the trial
judge's January 30, 2001 ruling.

(R.950-952)

Pinetree advanced - but did not prove, only intimated that the City had at one period in time allowed some public
buildings to be served by one connecting line and only one charge
assessed.

The traditional history of most cities is that since

incorporation, beginning especially in the penultimate decade of
the 1800s, several buildings accommodated multiple occupancies
but as the City's culinary water.distribution system was advanced
along

with

incorporation

of

the

City

and

dwindling

water

supplies, the Cities - and in this case Ephraim City - attempted
to isolate any

structure accommodating more than one consumer.

The City's response was that no unit was known to be in violation
of the multi-unit policy of the City but each unit was paying a
monthly charge for each unit irrespective of the outer perimeter
of the building

(Alan Grindstaff Affidavit R.499-507) .

Every

unit in each structure was assessed (and was compelled to pay)
a monthly minimum charge; all potential violators were denied
continuous culinary water (also, the City did not, at any time,
interrupt assessment of the monthly minimum charges even though
a unit was seasonally or sometime otherwise unoccupied).
506)

(R.502-

Pinetree Condominiums failed to show any discrimination

damaging the owners of individual condominiums.
19

In municipal bond obligations the City covenanted to
maintain consistency in meeting debt service obligations.
City

exhibited

to

the

bond

purchasers

the

capability

The
of

maintaining a system meeting the heaviest or the maximum demands
under any circumstance.

Lenders demanded a continuing disclosure

of sufficient consumer connectors to meet the maximum "demand"
for bond debt service as well as community health along with a
safe supply in storage.

All improvements to achieve that effect

were expensive, running to multiple millions of dollars; a huge
debt for small or medium-sized communities in Utah. (R.500-506)
The peak demands for electric power were not unlike a minimum
"demand" charge for water.
CONCLUSION
Pinetree Condominiums offered neither evidence of, nor
reason for, an exemption of 2 9 of the 3 0 units in one condominium
structure to justify the summary (or final) judgment against the
City which, in either nomenclature, should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
CHAMBERLAIN ASSOCIATES

Kerj/ Chamberlain
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two (2) copies of the foregoing
Brief of Appellant were mailed to the following by U.S. regular
mail, postage prepaid, on this 29th day of January, 2002:
Wayne H. Braunberger
Ashton, Braunberger, Boud & Draper
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and Appellees
765 East 9000 South, Suite A-l
Sandy, Utah 84094
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AM.

MOTION by Gwen McGarry to extend a variance to Bumpers allowing closing
hours to extend to 1:00 AM on weeknights and 12:00 midnight on Saturday
night* Second by Hilmer Peterson. Vote unanimous.
Discussion of Solid Waste Disposal covered the need for a new site,
mandatory pickup, sanitary landfill, and possibility of joining"other
cities in a county-vide effort. Mayor Jensen will pursue the joint Jk»J&tt
concept through the Mayors and Commissioners* Association.
Gwen McGarry reports that the Library Board will advertise for an assistant
librarian. She also reports that Richard V Nielsen resigned his position
on the Arena Committee. Several names were suggested. Ben Black was
appointed.
Roy Held reports that the cheese distribution went well. He also reports
that the Fire Dept needs a 2 n water connection at the Fire Station.
Discussion of hazard on west side of sidewalk where creek comes out
from the Main Street culvert resulted in a suggestion that the culvert
be extended on the west end by Doyle's. The culvert and part of the
creek should be cleaned. The City & Irrigation Company will coordinate
with Mrs McNeil.
Adjourned 9:30 FM. .

MINUTES OF REGULAR COUNCIL MEETING HELD FEBRUARY 17, 1982 at 7:00 FM.
PRESENT:

Mayor Jensen, Roy Reid, Keith Keisel, Leon Olsen, Hilmer
Peterson.

GUESTS:

Elaine Raid, Robert. H Fitch (Pine Tree Condo Project)
Ken 0 Cahoon (Pine Tree Condo Project), Seth Butterfield
(Butterfield & Associates, Inc), Seth L Butterfield
(Butterfield & Associates, Inc), Brent R Larson (Ephraim
Irrigation Co), Allan M Sharp (Mountain West Cable TV)
Douglas H Olson (Ephraim Irrigation Co), Earl Tuttie,
(Manti Soil Conservation Service), Lorin Hunt (Manti),
Arthur King (Ephraim Irrigation Co), Evelyn McNeill (Pyramid).

Elaine Reid reports that she lost sheep in November and again last week
from dogs. The police have told her to sign a complaint at the County
Attorney's Office. Mayor Jensen says the police have been very active
controlling dogs in the past year. Council members comment that she has
irsry right to be upset. Mayor Jensen will follow through with her
complaint tomorrow. . He states that he has suggested to the Mayors &
Commissioners Association that the County have an animal control officer
and get the cities1 to pay a proportionate share.

Doug Olson, President of the Ephraim Irrigation Company states that the
Irrigation Company feels it should apply for a complete sprinkler system
for the City and all the farm land which is under the Irrigation Co.
The plan is to put the water in a pipe from a pond site near Bald Mountain
for a small hydro generation plant to be located at the corner of H R
Christensen's property.
Earl Tuttle and Lorin Hunt of the Soil Conservation Service suggest
a joint venture between the city and the Irrigation Co. The project
could be divided into six (6) units: South, City, Lime Kiln, Kesko
(Old Cemetery), Haig, and North. It will take approximately five (5)
years from start to finish. 1.58 shares of water per acre would be
required. A citizens committee was suggested.
The Irrigation Company hks voted to purs ue the project. The city will
appoint a committee to accfeas public opinion. Soil Conservation Service
will work closely with the project.
Leon Olsen states that with Federal ar^ State getting more involved with
water, it is wise to get the most efficient use of water possible.
Allen Sharp says that Mountain West TV has completed 95% of the construction
and 90% of the service connections to those who are interested. He asks
that they be released from their performance bond. Discussion ensued
with Keith Keisel asking "Will this company skip as some other cable
franchises have?"
Leon Olaan: This company has money tied up in construction and materials
and can't afford to leave it. Roy Reid: Do they need an extension?
Hilmer Peterson: Cannot comment since I am not familiar with the franchise.
Paul Frichknecht: I see no further need for the bond. Mayor Jensen:
Some channels need to be cleared up. Perhaps the bond should be extended
for one (l) month.

r

MOTION by Roy Reid to extend Mountain West Cable TV performance bond to
April 7, 1982, to finish setting antenna and upgrade signals on some
channels"! SHcond-LejonJOleeir: Vote unanimous.

5£ Ken Cahoon and Robert Fitch of the Pine Tree Condominium Project propose
to change the 30 unit a&t&em housing to 30 unit condominium project due
to financing problems. The only difference would be that each unit
would have an owner, then rental to students could be a possibility.
Families could buy if they wish. Does the Council approve the concept
of condominiums? The power will be 3-phase. They would be ready for
construction April 1. Water and sewer billings will be on multiple
service (30 I - ) . The walls will have R-19 rating. Total cost approx
$1.2 million. Construction cost $900,000. Maintenance standards are
high. They ask for assurance that the community will ace ept the condominium
concept. They were directed to contact the Planning and Zoning Board for
letter.

\

Butterfield Associates^Siscussed possible financing. State—lan^allows
cities^to^establish a Redevelopment Agency with the Council acting as
the Agency. This allows tax increment financing for certain types of
projects. Mr Butterfield proposes that they contract to do the technical
work. The city would form a Redevelopment Agency which would have bonding
ability. The cost of this type of funding would amount to about 10%
on $300,000. Bonds could be ready for sale in three to six months.

